a). Discuss both(prenominal) of the issues elevated in Meta-Ethics. (17 mark)b). How convincing is the plenty that, when talk of theology, we ar talking more or less circumstances? (33 marks)(Total 50 marks)Notes Remember, in an test, you set out 30 trans fulfills to choose, plan, and write all es study. At AS Level, exam questions are twofold i.e., in that respect will be an (a) section and a (b) section. Do not forget to resolve both sections of a question Usually, the marks appear beside each section of a question. In each question, section (a) holds 17 marks, and section (b) holds 33 marks. A count of 50 marks per question. Write your responses to questions suitably its no penny-pinching having a little (a) section and a brief (b) This baffle es posit is structured so that it is down-to-earth in its time expectations. If you have revise thoroughly, and know your stuff, you should be writing this associate of exam essay. Remember, do not waffle. An quizzer will not assess 65% waffle and 35% palpable field in an exam essay grip your essay responses thorough, yet concise again, you have very little time to answer to questions Finally, it remains for me to wish you very unplayful luck, happy last minute revision, and a most successful first exama. Discuss some of the issues raised in Meta-Ethics.Ethics is the study of how raft behave, and how they should behave. It is ground on ideas of what is goodly sound. But, in order to understand chastes, a comment of in effect(p) needs to be determined. Here, iodine sees that such ideas will vary from psyche to psyche and from culture to culture. Likewise, such ideas pardon wherefore there is such a variety of moral systems in lend cardinalself today and a marked remnant in the level of commitment to a ain moral inscribe.Ethics and h singlest dustup, the study of which Meta-Ethics is part, send packing be conk out into three distinct branches descriptive, normative an d meta- h starst. On the angiotensin-converting enzyme hand, descriptive ethics describes the submitive style we live and the moral choices we happen to make. On the other, normative ethics employs the kind of language which is more openly moral and presents a clearer idea about what is held to be salutary or aggrieve so, a narration such as It is forever and a day ill-use to tell a lie is a normative recital. Contrastingly to both, meta-ethics is the study of the core of ethics itself, gauging the importation of ethical language, and taking into consideration the authority of moral claims and the effects of undivided(prenominal) preference.Bearing this in mind, it is vi able to note that meta-ethical theory poses questions such as Can we ascertain which action is smashing, bad, right, or unseasonable? and again, Is it realizable to give a interpretation to safe, bad, right, or wrong in themselves? Admittedly, all quartet of these phrases are related from a moral superman of view. But, if we could measure exhaustively tout ensemble and accurately, then we would be able to measure everything else against it. Yet, philosophically, it is unachievable to define great so completely. For instance, if one were asked to define chickenhearted(a), one is able to say what yellow is bid (such as Yellow is like a bananas hood) but, one unable to say completely and accurately what yellowness is. Thus, in the equal bearing, one is able to say what good is like, yet one is unable to say what good is. Naturally, it could be argued that good actions furnish to the well-being of all relate but, again, good actions depend very a lot on individual preference and ones individual idea of good.The puzzle, then, of how to define good has intrigued philosophers for thousands of years. Indeed, the ancient classical philosopher, Aristotle, define good as being how remote something fulfilled its use in life sentence for example, a good building is one which looks pleasing aesthetically, provides comfort and shelters from the elements. Similarly, a good person is one who fulfils well the case into which he or she has been placed. To illustrate this point further, a good buckle down flora well as a slave and, again, a good ruler rules the confederacy effectively, maximising everyones happiness. This nest has its origins in the Greek word telos meaning purpose and is therefore referred to as the teleo rational approach to ethics, a purpose- ground bar for gauging what is good.A differing method is the deontological approach to ethics, which has its origins in the Greek word deon meaning duty. unlike the teleological approach, this one is a duty-based criterion for gauging what is good something is good if it fulfils it duty. For instance, Immanuel Kant, bearing in mind the absolute rule of worship Do not steal, claimed that one should never steal under any(prenominal) circumstances because it is always wrong in itsel f. For example, if you came across something that had been aban through with(p)d by mortal who could not possibly have any use for it, even if you needed it and it would brook no one to take it, it is suave stealing and, therefore, wrong in itself. Thus, to do good, one always mustiness do ones duty.Meta-ethics, then, attempts to go a long way in explaining the essence of good and good action, combining alike viewpoints yet, likewise, displaying very different perspectives of the real meaning of good.b. How convincing is the view that, when talking of ethical motive, we are talking about facts?But, when attempting to define good, and certainly when considering ethics as a whole, is it actually possible to say that moral systems deal with facts? some ethicists would claim not. GE Moore, for example, in his prevail Principia Ethica (1902) claimed that good is impossible to define because it entirely depends on the moral codes a person brings to a particular situation. This wou ld suggest that, owe to the wide range and variety of personal preference in ethical systems, it is impossible to talk of facts when dealing with faith. Moore, though, did suggest that good was an entity in itself and that it was something which piece beings intuitively sought. Indeed, human beings do a thing that is good in order to achieve some long-term goal. However, he stated that in doing so, commonwealth commit what he coined the naturalistic error. Namely, that in finding oneself in a particular moral dilemma people assume it is natural and logical to shift immediately from dilemma to solution, treating moral certaintys as if they were absolute.For instance, imagine a 15 year old missy having her make merry spiked by a much older man who then makes her great(predicate). Indeed, the daughter did not want a familiar relationship with the man and was horrified when she realised what had happened, particularly because she was a devout Christian with high moral stand ards. Many people would say that the girl ought to be offered aesculapian treatment such as the morning-after oral contraceptive pill or an abortion.Here, use the principle cognise in moral philosophy as Humes Law, Moore would claim that people have committed the Naturalistic Fallacy because they have moved from an is statement to an ought statement. In other words, they move from a description of how things actually are, to how they ought to be. Put in a simpler form, (A) A teenaged girl is pregnant against her wishes (B) She ought to be offered an abortion. A is the is statement, B is the ought statement yet, to move from one to the other, Moore claimed that an intermediate (or, midway) overture is needed. This could be as follows A cleaning woman should only carry a nestling to all-inclusive term when she has elect to be pregnant. This is known as a lever proposal and it is this element of the equation that gives the conclusion (B) its moral force.But exactly why does M oore refer to this straight shift from an is to an ought a misleading notion? It is because (B) is evidently a blind, nave opinion without any nurse whatsoever. The intermediate proposition gives it moral nurse and force because it establishes that the pregnant girl is uncomplete a woman nor one who has chosen to be pregnant. Thus, it states that she is a teenage girl who is pregnant against her wishes and, because of the intermediate proposition of women only carrying a child to full term when she has chosen to be pregnant, the girls situation goes against the moral code. Naturally, using a different moral esteem in the intermediate stage would pee-pee a different outcome, which suggests that, when talking of godliness and moral codes, we are not always talking about facts.Like Moore, whose claims lour the idea of morality being factually-based, RM coney developed a theory for ethical language called Prescriptivism, in which he claimed that in prescribing a particular cour se of action for others, people ought to ask Am I prepared to prescribe that somebody else should do it to me if the roles were reversed?. (Interestingly, this idea is parallel with the grand rule of Christianity that appears in Matthew 712 Do unto others as you would have done unto you.)Although this gives the impression that all people should be treated equally, it does not suggest that morality is factually-based because such moral rules can be accepted or rejected. example statements, then, tally to coney, are more than mere signs of the personal preference of the speaker for him, they prescribe a course of action. But, just as he claimed moral rules are hugely most-valuable in influencing lives, he also added that one cannot say moral rules are lawful or false. Thus, it is untrue that when talking of morality we are talking about facts.In morality, then, there is a difference in how language is used. In everyday communication, language can be used in either cognitive o r non-cognitive ways. use cognitively, language states fact and reasoning and is non-moral in other words, it has no moral set attached. However, used non-cognitively in a moral setting, language aims to register attitudes, exercising an function over people. In morality, this influence is to post people of the moral rightness or wrongness of an action.Indeed, CL Stevenson, a philosopher virtually associated with Emotivism a system of morality based on feeling claimed that, when used non-cognitively, the word good is very persuasive because it has a moral tag which tries to draw the attendee into taking a moral stance. It pulls on the emotions. Certainly, Stevenson suggested ones moral code is an emotional response one simply feels something is good or bad. Again, then, it is impossible to say that when we talk of morality, we talk of facts because, as Emotivism shows, individual feelings differ and, therefore, individual moral codes influenced by feelings similarly are goi ng to differ.Thus, in conclusion, it is unconvincing to say that, when we are talking of morality, we are talking about facts Moore, would take for because his value propositions in moral dilemmas can easily be altered to produce a different outcome and, therefore, a different moral force Hare claimed one cannot say moral rules are true or false, therefore flunk to deliver morality to the territory of fact and, finally, Stevenson claims that individual moral codes are influenced by individual feelings about the rightness or wrongness of an action, thus rendering factually-based morality a nonsense owing to the comfortable diversity of individual emotion.Indeed, the highly prestigious philosopher, AJ Ayer would agree with such an avowal because he suggested all moral statements are nonmeaningful statements. For example, how could one prove that it is wrong to prankster? He insisted that such statements as Is it wrong to cheat are totally without meaning or provable sense because , logically and empirically, they cannot be shown to be true. tout ensemble one can do is show that lashings of people believe it is wrong to cheat. All they can do is express a personal dislike of cheats, cheating, and its consequences they can express how they consider it to be unfair. That is, they can express how it does not coincide with what they believe to be fair and right but that is all. Moral statements, then, are reduced in this way to personal preferences and are not concerned with fact.